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“Every thing is worth what its purchaser will pay for it.” 
—Publius Syrus1 
INTRODUCTION 
In less than a decade, the annual value of appraisal claims in Delaware has 
increased tenfold over historical levels.2 The driving force behind this growth 
has been the emergence of an investment strategy known as appraisal arbitrage.3 
Appraisal arbitrageurs buy a target company’s shares after the announcement of 
a merger, oppose the transaction, and then make—or threaten to make—an 
appraisal claim in order to capture a value greater than the merger price.4 Because 
of the development and growth of this investment strategy, the “appraisal remedy 
has been transformed from a forgettable attribute of stock ownership” into a 
viable mechanism for challenging opportunistic mergers.5 Thus, absent further 
legislative reform or a shift in the Delaware Court of Chancery’s approach to 
appraisal, the appraisal remedy stands to remain an important part of the 
framework for ensuring corporate accountability going forward. 
Much noise has been made concerning the development of “buying into” 
a lawsuit. On the one hand, some scholars have embraced appraisal arbitrage, 
viewing its development as a net positive.6 They argue that decisions to 
initiate appraisal proceedings are correlated to litigation merit and can serve 
as a safeguard against poor sales processes.7 Nonrobust sales processes, 
including those that lack a market auction, may not result in the highest price 
possible, and indeed, the transactions targeted for appraisal proceedings tend 
to have unusually low premia.8 As such, appraisal suits may actually be 
initiated when target shareholders are receiving too little consideration for 
their shares. On the other hand, deal lawyers unsurprisingly have been vocal 
 
1 PUBLIUS SYRUS, THE MORAL SAYINGS OF PUBLIUS SYRUS, A ROMAN SLAVE 71 (D. Lyman, 
Jr. trans., Cleveland, L.E. Barnard & Co. 1856) (46-29 BC). 
2 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company 
M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage] 
(noting the rise in value of appraisal claims to $1.5 billion in 2013, a “tenfold increase from 2004”). 
3 See id. (discussing the development and staggering growth of “specialized investment strategies 
based on appraisal”). 
4 See Philip Richter et al., The Rise of Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some 
Practical Implications, INSIGHTS, July 2014, at 18 (describing the mechanics of appraisal arbitrage). 
5 Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation 1 (Brooklyn Law Sch. 
Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 431, 2016) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation], 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2712088 [https://perma.cc/773H-VFAL]. 
6 See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1555 (concluding from empirical 
evidence that appraisal arbitrage is, on the whole, a “beneficial development”). 
7 See id. at 1554-55 (discussing the additional control, and risk, that appraisal arbitrageurs have 
when bringing their claims, as opposed to plaintiffs’ attorneys). 
8 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5 (noting that “[a]ppraisal petitions are 
associated with deals that have abnormally low merger premia”). 
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critics of this practice.9 They argue that the mere threat of appraisal litigation 
stands to reduce the number of beneficial deals that are closed and to block 
shareholders from capturing higher value in transactions that are actually 
consummated.10 Under this view, the possibility of appraisal litigation causes 
potential acquirers to offer lower bids and require restrictive closing conditions 
in order to account for potential litigation costs and the uncertain outcome of 
an appraisal proceeding, leading to deal failures and lower purchase prices.11 
Both sides of this debate have called on the Delaware legislature to reform 
its appraisal statute.12 Scholars who approve of the appraisal remedy have 
suggested a number of amendments that would expand and, in their view, 
improve the appraisal process.13 Deal lawyers, conversely, have advocated for the 
Delaware legislature to restrict appraisal rights by denying them to shareholders 
who purchase shares after the record date for the merger vote.14 Currently, the 
relevant date for entitlement to appraisal rights is the closing date of the 
transaction. Transactional advisors claim that reforming that date will 
prevent appraisal arbitrageurs from having the option to wait and then “buy 
into” a lawsuit if there are developments between the record date and the 
 
9 See, e.g., Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb Appraisal Arbitrage Abuses, 
COLUM. L. SCH.: CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 10, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/02/10
/delaware-legislature-should-act-to-curb-appraisal-arbitrage-abuses/ [https://perma.cc/U4X3-5ZZJ] (arguing 
that there is an “urgent need for legislative reform in Delaware to ameliorate the risk that appraisal 
arbitrage—now a multibillion dollar industry—poses to transactional vitality and shareholder value”). 
10 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 3-4 (distilling the arguments 
commonly made by those who favor amending the appraisal statute). 
11 Korsmo and Myers make just this point, stating, “Merger agreements might cabin appraisal 
liability by including a closing condition allowing the acquirer to walk away if more than some 
specified percentage of stockholders demands appraisal, but that solution is unattractive to sellers 
(because it reduces the certainty of the deal) and also to buyers (because it allows dissenting 
stockholders to veto the transaction). The result of this uncertainty, in the transactional advisors view, 
is that acquirers facing potential appraisal liability will lower their bid to account for the expectation 
of an appraisal suit, and non-dissenting stockholders will be penalized by this holdback.” Id. at 4. 
12  See, e.g., id. at 5 (suggesting expansion and improvement of the statutory remedy rather 
than its curtailment); Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, Davis Polk & Wardell LLP, 
Latham & Watkins LLP, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett 
LLP, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP & Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Council of the Corporate 
Law Section, Del. State Bar Ass’n & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Ruby R. Vale Professor of Corp. & 
Bus. Law, Widener’s Inst. of Del. Corp. Law 2-3 (Apr. 1, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Seven Firm Letter] (calling for amendment of the Delaware appraisal statute). 
13 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 5 (suggesting that Delaware 
policymakers “consider a number of amendments to expand and improve the appraisal remedy: 
eliminating the exception for all-stock transactions, introducing a de minimis exception, and 
requiring more disclosure from companies so that stockholders are in a position to make an informed 
decision about exercising their appraisal rights”). 
14 See Seven Firm Letter, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing that there is “no justification for 
permitting holders who purchased their shares after the record date for the vote to seek appraisal as 
if they were ‘dissenters’”). 
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closing date that arbitrageurs believe would increase a court’s determination of 
the fair value of their shares.15 
Delaware’s Corporation Law Council (the Council), the body responsible 
for suggesting amendments to the corporate code to the Delaware legislature,16 
heard these cries for reform and proposed two amendments to the appraisal statute 
in the spring of 2015.17 First, the Council suggested a de minimis requirement in 
order to eliminate nuisance suits. Under that proposal, shareholders seeking 
appraisal would have to collectively hold at least one percent of total shares 
outstanding or one million dollars’ worth of shares.18 Second, the Council 
proposed a provision intended to offset the potential economic incentive created 
by the interest owed to successful appraisal plaintiffs. Specifically, the amendment 
sought to allow the acquiring company “at any time before the court enters 
judgment in an appraisal action, . . . [to] pay to each stockholder seeking appraisal 
rights an amount of cash, with interest continuing to accrue only on the amount 
that is the difference between that cash payment and the court’s ultimate award.”19 
The Delaware legislature did not adopt these amendments in 2015.20 The Council 
then issued substantially the same suggestions in the spring of 2016, only adding 
that the de minimis requirement should not apply to parent/subsidiary mergers 
approved under section 253 or 267 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL).21 The legislature responded by approving the addition of these 
amendments on June 8, 2016.22 
In this Comment, I argue that further calls for reform to the appraisal 
remedy should be aimed at the Delaware Court of Chancery. The purpose of 
this Comment is not to express a normative judgment about the overall 
 
15 See, e.g., Norwitz, supra note 9 (deeming this phenomenon the “‘heads-I-win-tails-I-don’t-
lose’ option for arbitrageurs”). 
16 See About the Section of Corporation Law, DEL. ST. B. ASS’N (2016), http://www.dsba.org/sections-
committees/sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law/ [https://perma.cc/BBR9-B9VJ] (discussing the responsibilities 
of the Council, including recommending amendments to the Delaware corporate code). 
17 See Proposed 2015 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, WILSON SONSINI 
GOODRICH & ROSATI (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=
publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-DCGL.htm [https://perma.cc/S7CF-2FLF] (summarizing the Council’s 
proposed amendments to the DGCL, including those targeting appraisal rights). 
18 See id. (describing the Council’s first proposed amendment). 
19 Id. 
20 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 36 (“In an unusual turn, the 
amendments proposed by the Council were never introduced in the Delaware legislature.”). 
21 See Allison L. Land et al., Proposed Delaware General Corporation Law Amendments Would 
Address Appraisal Proceedings, Short-Form Mergers, Court of Chancery Jurisdiction, SKADDEN, ARPS, 
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.skadden.com/insights/proposed-dgcl-
amendments-would-address-appraisal-proceedings-short-form-mergers-court-of-chancery-jurisdiction 
[https://perma.cc/EU5A-9AGN] (discussing the Council’s proposed amendments for 2016). 
22 David Shine et al., Delaware Legislature Acts to Limit Appraisal Rights, STAY CURRENT (Paul 
Hastings LLP, Los Angeles, Cal.), May 2016, https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/
stay-current-delaware-legislature-acts-to-limit-appraisal-rights-(june-15).pdf [https://perma.cc/R7NA-FUL7]. 
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desirability of appraisal arbitrage; rather, I propose a shift away from the 
Chancery Court’s oft-favored valuation technique, discounted cash flow (DCF) 
analysis,23 in appraisal cases arising out of certain third-party, or arm’s-length, 
transactions. The Chancery Court should instead rely on merger price as the 
best estimate of the “fair value”24 of an appraisal petitioner’s shares when (1) 
the inputs required for a DCF analysis are unreliable and (2) there has been a 
genuine market test. 
Reliance on the merger price under these conditions would allay concerns 
on both sides of the debate. For proponents of appraisal arbitrage, this valuation 
approach does not impinge on shareholders’ ability to resort to the appraisal 
remedy by restricting their deadline to the record date. Additionally, the 
Chancery Court’s embrace of merger price would incentivize additional 
disclosure by target companies in order to demonstrate that the sale process 
was fulsome.25 For opponents of appraisal arbitrage, when there has been a 
genuine market test and a DCF analysis is unreliable, the use of merger price 
punishes appraisal petitioners when their claims are unwarranted (i.e., purely 
speculative investments aimed at low-premium transactions). Appraisal 
arbitrageurs cannot profit from “buying into” a lawsuit when the merger price 
is used as fair value; they must bear litigation expenses and additionally may 
face a “synergy deduction,” as appraisal claimants cannot capture any value 
arising from the expectation of the merger.26 Thus, this approach to valuation 
would only encourage claims where there is real reason to believe that the price 
achieved in the merger was not “fair”—namely, in controlling shareholder and 
parent/subsidiary mergers—and would remove some uncertainty from third-
party mergers (the transactions that are the primary focus of M&A lawyers). 
Following a description of the history and purpose of the appraisal statute 
and the mechanics of an appraisal suit in Part I, Part II of this Comment 
 
23 See, e.g., In re Orchard Enter., No. 5713-CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) 
(“The proper way to value the petitioners’ shares is to value Orchard as a going concern . . . . This 
approach marries perfectly with the DCF method of valuation, which is based on the notion that a 
corporation’s value equals the present value of its future cash flows. By allocating the DCF value of 
Orchard in accordance with the dividend formula in the Certificate of Designations . . . the mandate 
of 8 Del. C. § 262 to award the petitioners ‘the fair value of [their] shares’ is faithfully implemented.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
24 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016). 
25 This approach is similar to a proposed statutory “safe harbor from appraisal claims where [a 
target company] can demonstrate that the merger price was subjected to a genuine market test.” 
Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1608. The proposed reliance on merger price 
advocated by this Comment, however, requires that the DCF inputs be unreliable, which can occur 
in situations like those discussed in Part III, infra. 
26 See § 262(h) (“Through such proceeding the Court shall determine the fair value of the 
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or 
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair 
value.” (emphasis added)). 
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provides an overview of the recent emergence and growth of appraisal claims 
and discusses factors that may have contributed to this increase. While none 
of these factors alone seems to explain the rise in appraisal claims, when taken 
together, they indicate that unless there are further legislative or judicial 
restrictions, appraisal arbitrageurs will persist in employing the remedy in 
order to check—or profit from—third-party mergers. Part III addresses the 
Chancery Court’s historical approach to determining fair value, as well as its 
increasing willingness to use merger price as the best evidence of fair value.27 
This Part also discusses the need to calculate synergies if merger price is to 
be used to find fair value, given that section 262(h) of the DGCL requires fair 
value to be determined exclusive of any value arising from the merger.28 
Although a legal framework for this calculation is not well-established, it is a 
feasible calculation for parties and the court to make. Part IV discusses the 
Chancery Court’s decision in LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International 
Corp.,29 a case in which appraisal arbitrage and the court’s use of merger price 
to determine fair value dovetail. Longpath exemplifies not only a situation where 
the use of DCF analysis is inappropriate, but also illustrates the need to develop 
a robust analytical framework for valuing synergies. This Part also addresses the 
Chancery Court’s recent appraisal decisions in In re Appraisal of Dell Inc.30 and In 
re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp.,31 in which the court did not rely exclusively on 
merger price, and explains why these decisions are not inconsistent with this 
Comment’s ultimate argument. Finally, in Part V, I propose a framework for 
when the Chancery Court should rely on merger price as the best evidence of 
fair value in appraisal proceedings, namely, when there has been a genuine 
market test and the inputs for a DCF analysis are unreliable. 
 
27 See, e.g., LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, 
at *20 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“[I]n the situation of a proper transactional process likely to have 
resulted in an accurate valuation of an acquired corporation, this Court has looked to the merger 
price as evidence of fair value and, on occasion, given that metric one-hundred percent weight.”); 
Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., No. 8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 
2015) (“[B]ecause the Merger price appears to be the best estimate of value, the Court will put full 
weight on that price.”); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at 
*23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (finding “fair value in these circumstances best represented by the market 
price”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 
1, 2013) (deciding, under the circumstances, to “rely on the merger price as the best and most reliable 
indication of CKx’s value”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., 847 A.2d 340, 343 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (concluding that “the Merger Price is the best evidence of fair value”). 
28 See § 262(h) (providing that “the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of 
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation”). 
29 2015 WL 4540443. 
30 No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016). 
31 No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016). 
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I. OVERVIEW OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS 
Shareholders’ statutory right to appraisal grew out of the shift away from 
the traditional requirement that shareholders unanimously consent in order 
to proceed with a merger or other fundamental corporate change.32 Although 
the unanimity requirement afforded great protection to individual shareholders, 
it also gave rise to a holdout problem, as an equity holder with just one share 
could block the entire transaction.33 To cure this issue, states amended their 
corporate statutes to replace the unanimity requirement with a majority-vote 
rule.34 This change increased overall corporate efficiency, but it left minority 
shareholders vulnerable to the will of the majority in the context of changes in 
corporate control.35 States addressed this new issue by expanding statutory 
appraisal rights, which allow dissenting minority shareholders to escape a 
transaction approved by the majority.36 More specifically, appraisal rights 
permit dissenting shareholders who believe the merger price is inadequate to 
petition the court for a determination of the fair value of their shares.37 
Because appraisal rights are creatures of state law, they vary by 
jurisdiction.38 In Delaware, shareholders must meet certain standing 
requirements and take certain affirmative actions in order to exercise their 
appraisal rights. To start, the appraisal remedy is only permitted in the 
merger context.39 Additionally, for public companies, the availability of 
 
32 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair 
Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 615 (1998) (explaining that the appraisal remedy developed “as a quid pro 
quo for the loss of shareholders’ right to veto fundamental corporate changes”). 
33 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1558 (describing the “holdout problem” 
that arose from unanimous consent requirements); see also George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 
NW. L. REV. 1635, 1642 (2011) (“[A]ny single shareholder could block the deal, and the expansion of 
shareholder rosters during [the early twentieth century] raised serious holdout problems . . . .”). 
34 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1558 (describing the transition from 
a unanimity requirement to majority-vote rule). 
35 See id. (noting that the change to majority-voting “stripped minority shareholders of protection 
against majority expropriation”); see also Geis, supra note 33, at 1642-43 (explaining that the shift away 
from the unanimity requirement “led to concerns that majority owners could trample over the interests 
of minority shareholders—say, by merging with firms engaged in risky or objectionable activity”). 
36 See Geis, supra note 33, at 1643 (“A merger could move forward with less-than-unanimous 
approvals, but minority owners had an escape if they disliked the shift in direction.”). 
37 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1558-59 (“Appraisal affords 
minority shareholders who object to a fundamental transaction the opportunity to exit from the 
enterprise on terms set by a judge . . . .”). 
38 States that have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) have the same or 
similar appraisal remedies. See id. at 1559 (discussing the broad availability of appraisal in MBCA states). 
In this Comment, I focus on the Delaware appraisal statute, given that more than fifty percent of all 
publicly traded companies in the United States are incorporated in Delaware. Division of Corporations: About 
Agency, ST. DEL., http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/T6A3-GG5H]. 
39 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1559 (“In Delaware . . . only mergers 
give rise to appraisal rights.”). 
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appraisal rights depends on the form of the merger consideration: the remedy 
exists in an all-cash merger but generally not in a stock-for-stock merger—i.e., 
when shareholders receive relatively liquid equity securities in exchange for their 
shares in the target company or any other public company.40 This “market-out 
exception,” which denies appraisal rights to minority shareholders, exists when 
the merger consideration consists of stock listed on a national securities exchange 
or is held by more than 2000 record owners.41 Additionally, to have standing, 
a shareholder must be a record stockholder continuously from the time the 
appraisal claim is made through the effective date of the merger.42 
The 2016 amendments to section 262 imposed an additional standing 
requirement. The Court of Chancery must dismiss any appraisal action unless 
(1) the number of shares entitled to appraisal is greater than one percent of 
the outstanding shares in that class; (2) the merger consideration for the shares 
entitled to appraisal is greater than one million dollars; or (3) the transaction 
in question is structured as a short-form merger.43 These amendments were 
aimed at eliminating appraisal claims having a de minimus amount of money 
at stake, while explicitly preserving the appraisal remedy in the short-form 
merger context, which the courts historically have viewed with suspicion.44 
Shareholders must also comply with a number of affirmative requirements to 
perfect their appraisal rights. First, they must deliver a written demand for 
appraisal to the company before the merger vote.45 Second, shareholders must 
either vote against the transaction or abstain from the vote entirely.46 Finally, 
assuming the merger was approved by shareholder vote, the dissenting 
shareholders must file a petition seeking appraisal with the Delaware Court of 
Chancery within 120 days of the effective date of the merger.47 In contrast to 
breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits, there is no class action or fee-shifting mechanism 
available in appraisal actions, making appraisal suits riskier for plaintiffs.48 
 
40 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2016). 
41 Id. § 262(b)(1); see also Geis, supra note 33, at 1646 (explaining that the “market-out 
exception” is premised on the thought that appraisal proceedings would be “a waste of time if 
dissenters preserve their equity position while still enjoying an exit option via a public sale”). 
42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (2016). 
43 Id. § 262(g). 
44 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994) (“Entire fairness 
remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in examining an interested merger, irrespective of 
whether the burden of proof remains upon or is shifted away from the controlling or dominating 
shareholder, because the unchanging nature of the underlying ‘interested’ transaction requires 
careful scrutiny.”). 
45 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (2016). 
46 Id. § 262(a). 
47 Id. § 262(e). 
48 See Richter et al., supra note 4, at 19 (“Importantly, unlike other litigation challenging a deal, 
stockholders are unable to proceed as a class and shift attorneys’ fees to stockholders as a whole or 
to the defendants.”). 
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These procedural hurdles, together with the threat that a court may 
determine that the fair value of the plaintiff ’s shares is less than the merger 
price,49 mean that the incidence of appraisal claims is substantially less than 
breach of fiduciary duty claims.50 Nevertheless, due to the factors described in 
Section II.A. appraisal plaintiffs are incentivized to bring claims, and the 
appraisal remedy will continue to be a means of enforcing corporate 
accountability. 
II. THE GROWTH OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE 
Although the statutory appraisal remedy has been available for decades, 
activity in this area, once characterized as “a sleepy corporate law backwater,”51 
has exploded with the development of appraisal arbitrage as an investment 
strategy.52 In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate law scholars were dismissive of the 
usefulness of appraisal claims,53 and this view persisted into the twenty-first 
century.54 These critics rightly pointed out that transactions simply could be 
structured to avoid the appraisal remedy altogether55 and that the process of 
seeking appraisal was “chock-full of disadvantages for [dissenting] 
shareholders.”56 However, the value of appraisal claims increased tenfold from 
2004 to 2013, amounting to nearly $1.5 billion, a figure representing almost “one 
percent of the equity value of all merger activity in 2013.”57 Commentators 
attribute this exponential growth to appraisal arbitrageurs,58 who tend to be 
 
49 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1561 (explaining that courts “can, 
and occasionally do, determine fair value of the plaintiff ’s share to be less than the merger 
consideration” (footnote omitted)). 
50 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 47 (noting that “[v]irtually every 
merger faces a fiduciary duty class action”). 
51 Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2. 
52 Id. 
53 See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Merger and Takeovers, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304 (1974) (referring to appraisal claims as a “last-ditch check on management 
improvidence”); Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern 
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969) (characterizing appraisal actions as a “remedy 
of desperation”); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 
YALE L.J. 223, 260 (1962) (“The appraisal remedy is of virtually no economic advantage to the usual 
shareholder except in highly specialized situations.”). 
54 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1560 (noting that, as of 2015, 
“[a]cademic commentary continue[d] to take a sweepingly dismissive view of appraisal”). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. (quoting Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547 (Del. Ch. 2000)); see also id. at 1560-61 
(“These disadvantages tend to fall into three categories: (1) the procedural burdens of preserving and 
asserting an appraisal remedy; (2) the inability to proceed as a class and shift attorneys’ fees to shareholders 
as a whole or to defendants; and (3) the narrow and inflexible nature of the remedy available.”). 
57 Id. at 1553. 
58 Guarav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage—Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71 BUS. LAW. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616887 [https://perma.cc/M7FM-6XZP].  
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sophisticated, institutional investors.59 A number of hedge funds have filed 
multiple appraisal claims. The largest investor is Merion Capital, which has 
invested over $700 million in seven cases since 2010.60 Merion Capital, which 
is based in the suburbs of Philadelphia and is led by successful plaintiffs’ 
lawyer Andrew Barroway, raised a reported one billion dollars for a dedicated 
appraisal fund in 2013.61 This investment strategy has proven quite lucrative 
for Merion Capital, which “has averaged an 18.5% annualized return across 
five completed appraisals, four of which settled” prior to appraisal 
proceedings.62 As a point of comparison, the S&P 500 had a 12.9% annualized 
return for the period between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2015.63 Hedge 
funds, however, are not the only asset managers employing this investment 
strategy. Mutual funds and insurance companies, which have traditionally 
avoided shareholder litigation, have also filed appraisal petitions.64 
A. Factors Influencing the Rise of Appraisal Arbitrage Claims 
Commentators have set forth a number of possible reasons for the rise of 
appraisal arbitrage, yet none seems to explain the phenomenon on its own; 
rather, a confluence of these factors appears to have given rise to the growth 
of appraisal petitions.65 Although the purpose of this Comment is not to argue 
why appraisal suits have gained popularity, I lay out three factors as potential 
explanations. Understanding these factors helps to explain why appraisal arbitrage 
suits will continue to be an investment tactic if the status quo remains intact. 
First, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s holding in In re Appraisal of 
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. opened the door for an increase in appraisal 
arbitrage suits by extending the window of time in which investors can buy 
target companies’ shares and assert appraisal rights before the effective date of 
 
59 See Korsmo & Meyers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2 (noting that the “explosive growth” in 
appraisals has been “driven by sophisticated parties who specialize in bringing appraisal claims”). 
60 See id. at 1574-75 (discussing Merion Capital’s appraisal activity). 
61 See id. at 1575 (describing the fund and its activities). 
62 Liz Hoffman, Judge Rules in Favor of Hedge Fund ‘ Appraisal Arbitrage’ Strategy, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 7, 2015, 1:15 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-rules-in-favor-of-hedge-fund-appraisal-
arbitrage-strategy-1420571897 [https://perma.cc/PY8H-PC5S]. 
63 See Compound Annual Growth Rate (Annualized Return), MONEYCHIMP, http://www.moneychimp.
com/features/market_cagr.htm [https://perma.cc/C43H-86WS] (in “Date Range” box, enter “2010” after 
“Jan 1” and “2015” after “Dec 31”; then hit “Calculate”) (calculating an annualized return of 12.93% 
for that time period). 
64 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1575 (noting the recent filing of 
appraisal petitions by major mutual funds and insurance companies). 
65 See id. at 1582 (“In the end, we can identify no single causative factor to account for the rise 
in appraisal arbitrage. We suspect that it may simply be a case of a few investors who, somewhat by 
accident, found themselves considering appraisal as a method for salvaging an investment following 
a bad merger, became intrigued by the opportunity, and explored it further. As word spread of their 
success, others mimicked the strategy.”). 
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the merger.66 In Transkaryotic, shareholders owning approximately $400 million 
in foregone merger consideration sought appraisal.67 Of the nearly eleven 
million shares seeking appraisal, however, about eight million were acquired 
after the record date for voting on the merger, but before the actual vote was 
held.68 Thus, the legal issue presented by the case, as stated by the court, was 
whether “a beneficial shareholder, who purchased shares after the record date 
but before the merger vote, [must] prove, by documentation, that each newly 
acquired share (i.e., after the record date) is a share not voted in favor of the 
merger by the previous beneficial shareholder?”69 
The court ruled that the answer to this question was simple: “No.”70 One 
oft-cited law firm commentary summarized the holding as follows: 
The court ruled that the beneficial holders seeking appraisal did not have to 
establish how the specific shares they acquired after the record date were 
voted—which the parties to the litigation and the court agreed would be a 
practical impossibility. Rather, the Court embraced Cede as the holder of record 
and ruled that so long as beneficial owners of fewer than the aggregate number 
of Cede shares that were eligible for appraisal (that is, Cede shares either voted 
against the merger or not voted) directed Cede to seek appraisal, those shares 
would meet the statutory requirement and be eligible for appraisal.71 
In short, Transkaryotic gives investors more time to consider whether or 
not to bring an appraisal claim. Although some commentators have dismissed 
the Transkaryotic decision as having little effect on the frequency of claims,72 
others have noted that there is inherent value in being able to delay an 
 
66 See No. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (holding that a beneficial 
shareholder who acquires shares after the record date, but before the merger vote, need not prove 
by documentation that the previous beneficial owner did not vote the shares in favor of the merger). 
67 See id. at *1 (noting that nearly eleven million shares sought appraisal after foregoing merger 
consideration of thirty-seven dollars per share). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at *3 (emphasis in original); see also Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, 
at 25-26 (“For most publicly traded stock, the record owner is a depository trust such as Cede & Co., 
with purchases and sales on public exchanges merely altering the beneficial ownership of the relevant 
shares . . . . [S]tock most [sic] is held by depository trusts in fungible bulk.” (footnote omitted)). 
70 Id. 
71 Appraisal Arbitrage: Will It Become a New Hedge Fund Strategy?, M&A DEAL COMMENT. 
(Latham & Watkins LLP, L.A., Cal.), May 2007, https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub
1883_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC44-LQRH] [hereinafter Latham & Watkins]. 
72 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1579 (arguing that because the 
subset of appraisal actions that were affected by the Transkaryotic ruling did not increase with the 
same frequency as those that were not, “whatever legal changes [that] were wrought by the 
Transkaryotic decision do not appear to have moved the needle on appraisal activity”). 
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investment.73 Indeed, this ability to delay is akin to giving a free call option 
to appraisal arbitrageurs.74 
The option to delay investment provides a number of advantages to potential 
appraisal arbitrageurs, since the court determines fair value as of the time the deal 
closes, as opposed to the date of the merger announcement or vote. Take, for 
instance, the timeline of a typical deal as diagrammed by Jetley and Ji:75 
 
 
The Transkaryotic decision thus extended the time in which investors 
could buy shares of the target company from tr to tc, giving appraisal 
arbitrageurs, on average, a seventy-four-day call option.76 This option is 
valuable because it gives an investor more time to analyze a potential investment. 
 
73 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 6-7) (discussing how the simple ability to delay 
investment in a target company allows arbitrageurs to reduce their risk and maximize returns). 
74 See id. (manuscript at 7) (“Allowing appraisal arbitrageurs to delay their investment in target 
company stock . . . is akin to giving them [a call] option. . . . [A]ppraisal arbitrageurs do not pay for 
this option and, thus, the value of the option is essentially a transfer of value from the acquiring 
company to the arbitrageurs.”). It is this “free option” that prominent defense law firms have called 
upon the Delaware legislature to remove.  
75 Id. (manuscript at 18 fig.1).  
76 See id. (manuscript at 17) (explaining that in a “typical cash-only friendly transaction . . . the 
average time period between the record date and the deal consummation is 74 days”). 
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This delay allows an investor “to take advantage of any development[s] or new 
information,” such as macroeconomic changes, industry shifts, or company-
specific material from the definitive proxy statement.77 Moreover, postponing 
the share purchase may help an investor minimize deal risk, or the probability 
that the transaction later falls through.78 
A second factor that commentators have pointed to as an explanation for the 
increase in appraisal arbitrage activity is the interest rate that is statutorily due to 
appraisal petitioners,79 and which is awarded regardless of whether the appraisal 
value is higher or lower than the merger price.80 Pursuant to section 262, 
appraisal petitioners are owed interest on the value of their shares at “5% over the 
Federal Reserve discount rate,” compounded quarterly, using the effective date 
of the merger as a starting point.81 Thus, the attractiveness of bringing an 
appraisal claim is amplified in an era of historically low interest rates.82 
It is unlikely, however, that this disparity between the statutorily imposed 
interest rate and the prevailing market interest rate would, in and of itself, 
drive the spike in appraisal claims. The statutory interest rate, while attractive 
compared to the return on money market funds, is far less than the foregone 
equity rate in a robust market.83 The appraisal process is also rife with risk, 
as the court may award a fair value that is less than the merger price.84 Returns 
 
77 Id. (manuscript at 18). 
78 Id. 
79 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1579-80 (explaining that “in an era 
of historically low interest rates, the interest rate available to appraisal petitioners” under the 
Delaware appraisal statute may be “attract[ing] investors to appraisal”). 
80 Jetley & Ji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 48). 
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016). 
82 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 10) (“While the extent to which the statutory 
rate may drive arbitrageurs to seek appraisal is debatable, our findings are consistent with the notion 
that the relatively high current statutory rate does improve the economics for arbitrageurs.”); see also 
Daniel E. Wolf et al., Appraisal Rights—The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?, KIRKLAND M&A 
UPDATE (Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, N.Y.), May 1, 2013, at 2, http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/
Publications/MAUpdate_050113.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FGF-VCDG] (“In today’s ultra-low interest rate 
setting, the accumulating interest payments represent, if not an intriguing stand-alone investment 
opportunity, at least a meaningful offset to the extended period of illiquidity and litigation costs 
imposed on the dissenting shareholders for the duration of the proceedings.”). 
83 Even with the recession of 2008, the average annual return of the S&P 500 between 
2006 and 2015 remained 9.03%. Aswath Damodaran, Annual Returns on Stock, T.Bonds and T.Bills: 
1928–Current, N.Y.U. STERN SCH. BUS., http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page
/datafile/histretSP.html [https://perma.cc/4WN5-6CX4] (last updated Jan. 5, 2016); see also Jetley & 
Ji, supra note 58 (manuscript at 52) (“[I]n cases where the credit of the acquiring company (or the entity 
responsible for paying the fair value awarded to the petitioner) is rated ‘BB’ or higher, the statutory 
rate appears to overcompensate petitioners for a bond-like claim.”). 
84 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1580-81 (“Petitioners are only entitled 
to demand an award of interest if they take their claims all the way to trial, which typically takes well 
over a year and carries with it the risk that the appraised value could be less than the foregone merger 
consideration. The idea that sophisticated investors are pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into 
risky appraisal proceedings to chase above-market interest rates simply is not credible.”). 
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for investors in appraisal arbitrage claims are not as simple as the judicially 
determined fair price of their shares plus the interest rate. Rather, returns must 
also exclude enforcement costs, such as attorneys’ and experts’ fees, as well as 
the hedge fund’s management and performance fees.85 Additionally, this 
interest rate incentive was likely neutralized by the 2016 amendments to 
section 262, since acquiring companies can prepay merger consideration to 
appraisal plaintiffs, offsetting the statutory interest rate.86 
Third, and finally, an increase in appraisal activity may be attributed to 
the simple fact that more people, especially sophisticated investors, have 
begun to pay more attention to the remedy.87 As previously discussed, the 
appraisal arbitrage market has recently become composed of sophisticated, 
repeat players with significant amounts of capital at their disposal.88 
Furthermore, as opposed to fiduciary duty merger litigation, where lawsuits are 
omnipresent and the decision to bring a case is not tied to merit, there is 
evidence that the decision to invoke the appraisal remedy is correlated with 
litigation merit.89 Thus, the recent prominence of appraisal arbitrage claims 
may simply be the result of more smart, wealthy people recognizing that 
appraisal can be an attractive investment strategy. However, there is a risk 
that, like in the private equity industry, an influx of new entrants and their 
attendant capital will increase competition for a limited number of appraisal 
claims and result in lower appraisal returns for investors.90 
B. Backlash Against the Practice of Appraisal Arbitrage 
Although there is debate surrounding the reasons why appraisal claims 
have grown, it is undisputed that the practice of appraisal arbitrage has been 
met with resistance. Both corporations and defense-side law firms have been 
vocal in advocating for restrictive reforms to the Delaware appraisal statute. 
The first rumblings for change emerged in the wake of Transkaryotic. One 
prominent law firm predicted that the decision “ha[d] the potential to 
 
85 Dan Barufaldi, Hedge Funds: Structure, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/
hedge-fund/structures.asp [https://perma.cc/8SAZ-KVFJ]. 
86 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016). 
87 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1572 (“[T]he rise in appraisal 
activity since 2011 appears to reflect a secular increase in interest in appraisal, rather than a mere 
cyclical phenomenon tied to the conditions of the merger market.”). 
88 See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
89 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 2, at 1556-57 (noting that while “the 
evidence suggests that the merits matter” in appraisal litigation, “the evidence suggests the legal merits 
are functionally irrelevant” in the decision to bring suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty in a merger). 
90 See Steven Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns Persistence and 
Capital 24-25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 9807, 
2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9807.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ5D-2DJY] (discussing the effect 
of new entrants on various types of funds). 
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revolutionalize the use of appraisal rights” and warned of the possibility of 
“the creation of a new ‘market’ in appraisal rights” that could have a disruptive 
effect on the M&A market.91 While the firm may have been prescient, it 
nonetheless still took a few more years, the emergence of dedicated appraisal 
arbitrageurs, and two high-profile going-private transactions before appraisal 
suits came into the spotlight. 
In 2010, Merion Capital filed its first appraisal petition.92 In that same year, 
a number of other investors who all subsequently became prominent repeat 
players in the appraisal arbitrage market also filed claims.93 While these 
sophisticated investors were appraisal arbitrage trailblazers and are at the center 
of current policy debates, it was two multi-billion, highly publicized going-
private transactions that really garnered appraisal attention. The first was the 
eventually-successful attempt to privatize Dell Inc. by Michael S. Dell and 
Silver Lake Partners.94 This transaction proved to be contentious, and the 
most prominent of the investors opposed to the deal consideration was 
billionaire investor Carl Icahn, who had also been part of the dissenting group 
in Transkaryotic.95 As part of a tactic to extract a price greater than that offered 
by Michael Dell and Silver Lake, Icahn threatened to oppose the transaction 
and exercise his appraisal rights.96 In the end, Icahn did not follow through 
with his appraisal threat,97 but the pressure it created forced Dell and Silver 
Lake to increase their offer from $13.65 per share to $13.75 per share, plus a 
$0.13 dividend.98 This sequence of events provides at least three takeaways. 
First, Icahn’s campaign against Dell raised the profile of appraisal actions as 
 
91 Latham & Watkins, supra note 71. 
92 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text; see also Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, 
supra note 5, at 29 (“Merion is reputed to have raised capital devoted solely to the strategy of pursuing 
appraisal rights, and Merion’s investments in some targets were so large that it crossed the 5% threshold, 
triggering SEC filing requirements. Merion appears to invest in target companies exclusively after the 
announcement of a deal, with all Merion purchases of target stock disclosed on the relevant Form 13Gs 
occurring after the announcement of the merger transaction.” (footnote omitted)). 
93 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 29 (describing a number of funds 
that brought appraisal actions in 2010, which have “come to be among the most active appraisal 
petitioners in terms of dollars at stake” and which “all appear committed to appraisal as an 
investment strategy, making and dissenting on numerous large positions in target companies”). 
94 See Michael J. de la Merced, Icahn’s Latest Gamble at Dell: Appraisal Rights, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/icahns-latest-gamble-at-dell-
appraisal-rights/ [https://perma.cc/GQG3-RGJB] (reporting on the “new tactic” Carl Icahn was employing 
by urging his “fellow Dell shareholders . . . to start preparing appraisal rights for their shares”). 
95 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 30 (noting that Icahn was “a large 
part of the dissenting group in Transkaryotic”). 
96 de la Merced, supra note 94. 
97 Other investors, however, did seek appraisal. See infra Section IV.C. 
98 Miles Weiss, Carl Icahn Withdraws His Appraisal Request for Dell Stake, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
4, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-04/icahn-says-he-withdrew-
request-for-appraisal-on-dell [https://perma.cc/FK7E-9CAE]. 
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an investment strategy with the widespread media coverage it received.99 
Second, Icahn showed that the mere threat of an appraisal action could lead 
to a higher ultimate merger price.100 Third, if Icahn had extracted this higher 
offer, and nevertheless sought appraisal, Icahn could have used the higher 
offer as evidence of unfair bargaining on the part of Michael Dell and Silver 
Lake. Icahn could have potentially used this evidence in both the fiduciary 
duty and appraisal contexts. 
The second of these going-private transactions, a freeze-out merger of 
Dole Food Company by its Chief Executive (and controlling shareholder) 
David Murdock,101 resulted in Dole management seeking an amendment to 
Delaware’s appraisal statute. The appraisal action in In re Appraisal of Dole Food 
Company, Inc. was led by funds such as Merion Capital, Hudson Bay Capital, 
Magnetar Capital, and Fortress Investment Group, which collectively acquired 
nearly twenty percent of Dole stock immediately prior to the deal closing on 
November 1, 2013.102 
In response—and with one billion dollars on the line—Dole put on a full-
court press both inside and outside the courtroom, lobbying Delaware 
officials to amend the state’s appraisal statute.103 Importantly, Dole is the Port 
of Wilmington’s largest tenant, providing the state with steady revenues and 
850 jobs, which in theory should have provided Dole with leverage.104 Barely 
a month after the close of the Dole privatization, and after considering a move 
to Paulsboro, New Jersey, Dole signed a new fifteen-year lease with the Port 
of Wilmington.105 While corresponding about the lease, Andrew Lippstone, 
 
99 See, e.g., id. (reporting on Icahn’s threatened appraisal action); see also David Benoit & Ben Fox 
Rubin, Icahn Calls on Dell Holders to Seek Appraisal of Shares, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2013, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323740804578597433825380870 [https://perma.cc/XE2R
-4T55] (same); de la Merced, supra note 94 (same). 
100 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 30 (noting that Dell, Inc.’s 
“counsel has since explained that Icahn’s threat to dissent from the transaction prompted the merger 
parties to increase the merger consideration by $400 million”). 
101 Liz Hoffman, Dole Executives Ordered to Pay $148 Million in Buyout Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/dole-executives-ordered-to-pay-148-million-in-buyout-
lawsuit-1440686542 [https://perma.cc/83S5-DKSJ]. 
102 See Tom Hals, America’s Oldest CEO Puts His Dole Buyout to a High-Stakes Test, REUTERS (Aug. 
14, 2015, 2:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-dole-litigation-idUSKCN0QJ1ZK20150814 
[https://perma.cc/E4R4-HCU5] (discussing the investors involved in the appraisal suit); see also Dole 
Food Company, Inc. Stockholders Approve Merger, BUSINESSWIRE (Oct. 31, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://www.
businesswire.com/news/home/20131031006489/en/Dole-Food-Company-Stockholders-Approve-Merger 
[https://perma.cc/Z7YG-DP42] (stating that the merger was expected to close on November 1, 2013). 
103 See Hals, supra note 102 (noting that Dole had taken to “lobbying Delaware officials to 
amend” the state’s appraisal statute). 
104 Id. 
105 See Dole Signs 15-Year Lease with Port of Wilmington, DELAWAREONLINE (Dec. 10, 2013, 6:55 PM), 
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2013/12/10/dole-signs-15-year-lease-with-port-of-wilmington
/3969765/ [https://perma.cc/6VE6-F3X2 ] (announcing the signing of the lease). 
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Delaware’s Governor’s general counsel, wrote to Genevieve Kelly, Dole’s 
general counsel, expressing a willingness to attempt to amend the corporate 
code, stating he was “[h]appy to discuss next steps at [her] convenience.”106 As 
the litigation continued, Dole continued to press for reforms that would 
prevent hedge funds from buying lawsuits by restricting appraisal rights to 
long-term investors only and cutting the statutory interest rate.107 Dole even 
threatened reincorporation in a different state if changes were not made.108 
Prominent defense firms, many of which also have lucrative transactional 
advisory practices, jumped into the fray shortly thereafter. With appraisal 
arbitrage creating uncertainty and, thus, a potential decline in the M&A 
market, the firms supported Dole’s call for reform.109 These firms constitute 
a powerful voice because they advise many Delaware corporations on 
corporate transactions, and they also play a prominent role in selecting local 
counsel when disputes escalate to litigation in the Chancery Court.110 Deal 
lawyers at these firms rushed to publish commentary, arguing that the 
practice of appraisal arbitrage is not consistent with the purpose of appraisal 
statutes,111 hurts long-term shareholders,112 can lead to unrealistically high 
valuations,113 and poses a threat to efficient transactions.114 The target 
 
106 Hals, supra note 102. 
107 See id. (discussing the specifics of Dole’s lobbying efforts). 
108 See id. (describing a letter in which Kelly “wrote that hedge funds pursuing appraisal ‘show 
companies why there is a need to re-incorporate in more business friendly states’” as well as an email 
to Reuters in which Kelly stated “we have communicated that Dole will incorporate elsewhere if 
changes are not made”). 
109 See Liz Hoffman, Wall Street Law Firms Challenge Hedge-Fund Deal Tactic, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 
2015, 8:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-law-firms-challenge-hedge-fund-deal-tactic-14283
62171 [https://perma.cc/GE25-8CAD] (reporting that seven major law firms had sent a letter to the 
Council “urging changes to rules governing” appraisal proceedings). 
110 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 35 (“[I]t is these New York firms 
that often select Delaware counsel, and staying in the good graces of these firms is understandably 
crucial to the livelihoods of many Delaware lawyers.”). 
111 See Maurice M. Lefkort, Hedge Funds Can Still Manipulate Corporate Law, WHARTON MAG.: 
WHARTON BLOG NETWORK (Feb. 12, 2015), http://whartonmagazine.com/blogs/hedge-funds-can-
still-manipulate-stock-market-rule/ [https://perma.cc/5MFK-RU2W] (“Appraisal Arbitrage exploits 
the failure of the statutes governing appraisal rights to keep up with modern custody practice. Appraisal 
rights were designed to protect stockholders in a merger that they felt offered them too low a price. In 
Appraisal Arbitrage, an investor buys into a deal for the purpose of exercising appraisal rights.”). 
112 See id. (“Allowing this practice to continue will come at the expense of the stockholders who 
are not manipulating these rules, and at the efficiency of the mergers and acquisitions marketplace.”). 
113 The Growth of Appraisal Litigation in Delaware, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 
(Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/
wsgralert-delaware-appraisal-litigation.htm [https://perma.cc/SA8G-2K39] (“Management presentations 
made to the board in the context of the board considering its alternatives often include an ‘upside’ case 
that is admissible for appraisal purposes even if it was unrealistic as a practical alternative.”). 
114 See Norwitz, supra note 9 (arguing that there is an “urgent need for legislative reform in 
Delaware to ameliorate the risk that appraisal arbitrage—now a multibillion dollar industry—poses 
to transactional vitality and shareholder value”). 
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audience for the calls for reform was the Council, the body “responsible for 
formulating and recommending to the Delaware General Assembly . . . 
amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law.”115 
When the Council issued its proposed amendments in the spring of 2015, 
advocates for reform were underwhelmed. The Council suggested two 
amendments, neither of which went as far as the defense-side law firms 
wanted.116 First, the Council suggested a de minimis requirement in order to 
eliminate nuisance suits: the shareholders seeking appraisal would have to 
collectively hold at least one percent of total shares outstanding or one million 
dollars’ worth of shares.117 Second, the Council proposed a provision intended 
to offset the potential economic incentives of the statutory interest rate: 
[A]t any time before the court enters judgment in an appraisal action, the company 
surviving the merger can pay to each stockholder seeking appraisal rights an 
amount of cash, with interest continuing to accrue only on the amount that is 
the difference between that cash payment and the court’s ultimate award.118 
In response to this perceived failure to act, seven prominent law firms sent 
a letter directly to the Council expressing their disappointment over the 
limited scope of the proposed amendments and advocating for further 
reform.119 In the letter, the firms expressed their view that “the proposed 
 
115 See supra note 16. 
116 See Daniel G. Dufner, Jr. et al., Increasing Hostility Towards Appraisal Arbitrage, CLIENT 
ALERT MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (White & Case LLP, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2015, at 2, 
http://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/alert-increasing-hostility-
towards-appraisal-arbitrage.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JLG-QQKH] (“Despite the expectation that the 
proposed legislative reforms will be adopted by the Delaware legislature, they have been criticized as 
insufficient to effectively address the problems of appraisal arbitrage . . . .”); see also Abigail Pickering 
Bomba et al., Proposed Appraisal Statute Amendments Would Permit Companies to Reduce Their Interest 
Cost—Likely to Discourage “Weaker” Appraisal Claims and Make Settlement of “Stronger” Claims Harder, 
FRIED FRANK M&A BRIEFING (Fried Frank, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 23, 2015, at 5-6, http://www.
friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FINAL%20-%203-23-2015%20-%20Proposed%20Appraisal%20Statute
%20Amendments.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHC7-PBM4] (“The Amendments do not include any of the 
more far-reaching changes that have been advocated by companies and others seeking to limit the 
volume of appraisal claims and the prevalence of appraisal arbitrage, or to ameliorate the burden on 
the court of determining ‘fair value’, such as: a limitation on the types of transactions to which 
appraisal rights would be applicable; restrictions on the timing for filing an appraisal petition; a 
change in the definition of fair value; limiting appraisal rights to stockholders who owned their 
shares before announcement of the merger; further requirements with respect to establishing that 
shares have not been voted in favor of the merger; or establishing a burden of proof on the parties 
(rather than the Chancery Court) to determine fair value.”). 
117 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
118 Proposed 2015 Amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, supra note 17. It is unclear 
what would happen if the court’s ultimate award is less than the merger price. 
119 See Seven Firm Letter, supra note 12, at 1-2 (opining that “the proposed legislation [did] not 
adequately respond” to the threats created by appraisal arbitrage and advocating for reforms that 
they believed constituted a “minimum appropriate solution” to the situation); see also Hoffman, supra 
note 109 (describing the letter). 
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legislation [did] not adequately respond to the current circumstance in which 
decisions of the Delaware courts have opened the door to what has come to 
be called ‘appraisal arbitrage.’”120 Quoting a passage from Transkaryotic, the 
firms argued that the practice of appraisal arbitrage perverts the true purpose 
of the statutory appraisal right.121 The firms suggested amending the statute 
such that appraisal rights would only be available to those holding shares 
before the record date for the merger vote.122 This solution would remove the 
“free option”123 that appraisal arbitrageurs have when deciding to buy into a 
lawsuit and restrict the ability to resort to appraisal. 
In 2016, the Council recommended almost identical amendments, adding 
only that an appraisal suit should not be dismissed if the merger is a 
parent/subsidiary merger approved under section 253 or 267 of the DGCL.124 
The Delaware legislature responded to this repeated advocacy for reform by 
adopting these amendments on June 8, 2016.125 These amendments show that 
the Delaware legislature realizes that there is potential for appraisal arbitrage 
abuse,126 but the amendments do not go far enough to have meaningful impact. 
The amendments prevent nuisance suits, where paying off an opportunistic, 
small investor is cheaper than the cost of litigation. The amendments also 
negate the financial incentives created by the relatively high statutory interest 
rate. However, as one defense-side law firm points out, the amendments do 
 
120 Seven Firm Letter, supra note 12, at 1. 
121 See id. at 2 (“[Respondents] argue that this decision will pervert the goals of the appraisal 
statute by allowing it to be used as an investment tool for arbitrageurs as opposed to a statutory safety 
net for objecting stockholders. That is, the result I reach here may . . . encourage appraisal litigation 
initiated by arbitrageurs who buy into appraisal suits by free-riding on Cede’s votes on behalf of other 
beneficial holders—a disfavored outcome. To the extent that this concern has validity, relief more 
properly lies with the Legislature.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting In re 
Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007))). 
122 This recommendation would effectively undo the Trankaryotic holding. The firms argued, 
“We believe that strong equitable arguments can be made to deny appraisal rights to anyone purchasing 
after public announcement of a transaction, but at a minimum there is no justification for permitting 
holders who purchased their shares after the record date for the vote to seek appraisal as if they were 
‘dissenters.’ This approach would fulfill the legislative purpose of protecting stockholders of Delaware 
corporations who dissent from a merger that is subject to appraisal rights. It would also reduce the 
unseemly claims-buying that is rampant and serves no legitimate equitable or other purpose, but 
threatens to undermine transactional certainty and reduce value to shareholders of Delaware 
corporations as acquirers, particularly in leveraged transactions, may be forced to factor the enhanced 
appraisal risk into their calculations.” Id. at 2-3. 
123 See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
124 See Land et al., supra note 21 (describing the Council’s 2016 proposed amendments to the DGCL). 
125 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
126 When I refer to abusive appraisal claims, I mean those that are merely speculative 
investments, usually without any merit other than a relatively low premia. Appraisal arbitrageurs 
may use these claims to extract a settlement above the merger price, and acquiring companies may 
acquiesce due to the ex ante uncertainty of appraisal proceedings. See Hoffman, supra note 62 and 
accompanying text (noting that four of the five claims that Merion Capital brought were settled). 
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“not help buyers manage the deal price risk associated with the exercise of 
appraisal rights (including risk related to appraisal arbitrage), which is a long-
standing, unaddressed issue in Delaware public company transactions.”127 
A way to address the price risk issue is reform aimed at the Chancery Court. 
One means of disincentivizng the potentially abusive practice of appraisal 
arbitrage is the use of merger price as the best evidence of fair value when 
certain conditions hold. The conditions I suggest are (1) unreliable DCF inputs 
and (2) a true market test. By shifting to a situation-dependent use of merger 
price as fair value, courts will greatly disincentivize bringing meritless 
appraisal claims because claimants will no longer be able to profit from that 
strategy. At the same time, claimants could bring meritorious appraisal claims 
without worrying about this alternative to valuation methods such as DCF, 
because if there is a real reason to suspect the merger price was too low, the 
court will conduct its own independent analysis. Thus, the concepts of appraisal 
arbitrage and the use of merger price as fair value dovetail, presenting an 
approach to combat deal price uncertainty when there should be no uncertainty. 
III. DELAWARE’S APPROACH TO VALUATION IN APPRAISAL CASES 
The sole purpose of an appraisal proceeding is for the court to determine 
what minority shareholders are equitably owed for their stock. The DGCL 
defines the court’s role: 
[The Court of Chancery] shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive 
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of 
the merger or consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon 
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, 
the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.128 
This statutory instruction supplies four directives to the courts. First, the 
court must determine the “fair value” to be awarded to dissenting 
shareholders.129 The term “fair value,” however, is left undefined and is 
therefore left to courts’ interpretations. Second, the “fair value” must be 
“exclusive of any element of the value arising from the accomplishment or 
expectation of the merger or consolidation.”130 This provision has been 
interpreted to mean that any synergies arising out of a merger must be excluded 
 
127 Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Recent Delaware Appraisal Rights 
Developments Address Interest Rate Risk but Leave Certain Transactions Vulnerable on Deal Price 
3 (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.davispolk.com/publications/recent-delaware-appraisal-rights-developments
-address-interest-rate-risk-leave-certain/ [https://perma.cc/J5RC-MJVQ]. 
128 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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from the calculation of “fair value.”131 Third, in addition to “fair value,” 
petitioners are also owed interest on their shares.132 The rate of interest is 
statutorily defined as the sum of the Federal Reserve discount rate plus five 
percent,133 compounded quarterly, starting as of the effective date of the 
merger.134 Finally, courts must take into account “all relevant factors” when 
determining fair value.135 
A. Calculating “Fair Value” 
Courts often refer to the legal concept of “fair value” as the “going 
concern,”136 “true,”137 or “intrinsic”138 value. In 1950, the Delaware Supreme 
Court explained the legal meaning of “fair value”: “The basic concept of value 
under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for 
that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going 
concern.”139 In Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, the Delaware Supreme Court 
added that “[t]he dissenting shareholder’s proportionate interest is determined 
only after the company as an entity has been valued. In that determination, the 
Court of Chancery is not required to apply further weighting factors at the 
shareholder level, such as discounts to minority shares for asserted lack of 
marketability.”140 Therefore, in determining fair value, a court must pretend 
as if the merger had not occurred and calculate what the entire target company 
was worth as of the actual closing date. After determining that value, the court 
must then award the dissenting shareholders their pro rata share of the total 
going concern value. 
These guidelines, however, do not provide much guidance to the courts 
regarding how to calculate an actual numerical figure representing fair value. 
In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., established 
the current approach to measuring fair value, under which, “any techniques 
or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial 
 
131 See Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(noting that “the definition of fair value used in a § 262 proceeding . . . involves policy 
considerations, such as the need to exclude synergies in order to value the entity as a going concern”). 
132 § 262(h). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 See, e.g., Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 356 (describing the court’s “mandate [under section 262] 
that the subject company in an appraisal be valued as a going concern”). 
137 See, e.g., LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, 
at *9 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (using the term “true value” as a substitute for “fair value”). 
138 See, e.g., Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., No. 5233-VCP, 2012 WL 1569818, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
30, 2012) (referring to fair value as a company’s “intrinsic value”). 
139 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950). 
140 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989). 
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community” may be used to calculate fair value.141 This approach appears to 
be in harmony with the statutory mandate that “the Court shall take into 
account all relevant factors” when determining fair value.142 Accordingly, there 
are a number of possible approaches the courts can use when determining fair 
value, including a DCF analysis, a comparable companies analysis, a 
comparable transactions analysis, or the merger price less synergies.143 Courts 
are free to use any, none, or a combination of these approaches. 
Since Weinberger, the Chancery Court has grown to favor DCF analysis—
the preferred valuation methodology in the finance community—for its own 
determinations of fair value.144 DCF analysis requires the court to value the 
target company by discounting all future projected cash flows to their present 
value.145 The DCF approach has become favored in appraisal proceedings for 
both theoretical and contextual reasons. As a matter of theory, DCF analysis 
is universally considered the most accurate way to value a corporation because 
it provides a rigorous analytical framework. Additionally, appraisal is often 
conducted in the context of a target company that is either private or only 
thinly traded. Although this context presents difficulties for a DCF analysis, 
since many of its inputs are dependent on a liquid trading market for the 
company’s stock,146 a DCF analysis is often still considered more reliable than 
a comparables analysis, especially when the target company operates in a 
 
141 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
142 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016). 
143 Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 457, 460 (1996) (listing these various techniques “for determining the 
value of the assets or shares of a target corporation”). 
144 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the 
“Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 47 (2007) [hereinafter, 
Hamermesh & Wachter, Implicit Minority Discount] (“In the appraisal remedy, the favored method 
for calculating the fair value of the corporation is the preferred method in finance for calculating the 
fair value of the corporation—that is, the discounted future free cash flows or DCF.”); see also Neal 
v. Ala. By-Products Corp., No. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (describing the 
DCF method as “the preeminent valuation methodology”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 
7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (“In many situations, the discounted cash flow 
technique is in theory the single best technique to estimate the value of an economic asset.”), rev’d 
on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). 
145 The Court outlined DCF analysis in ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, explaining, “The DCF 
model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate 
and when, over some period; a terminal value equal to the future value, as of the end of the projection 
period, of the firm’s cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital with which 
to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated terminal or 
residual value.” 751 A.2d 904, 917 (Del. Ch. 1999) (quoting Technicolor, 1990 WL 161084, at *7). 
146 See Lawrence Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware 
Appraisal Law, 2005 J. CORP. L. 119, 125 n.33 [hereinafter Hamermesh & Wachter, Cornfields] 
(explaining that “the theory assumes stock trades in liquid capital markets, which rules out closely 
held but publicly traded stock”). 
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niche market.147 When the target company is either privately held or thinly 
traded, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify publicly traded companies 
that are sufficiently comparable to provide a reliable valuation.148 Likewise, 
similar difficulties arise when trying to identify comparable transactions when 
the target company is small and operates in a niche market.149 
The DCF methodology, however, is more of an art than a science, as it is 
highly sensitive to a number of important assumptions.150 Furthermore, even 
the staunchest proponents of the DCF method acknowledge that it is weakest 
when used in the typical appraisal context.151 To start, flawed income statement 
projections render a DCF analysis useless ab initio. Additionally, other 
assumptions, such as the terminal value multiple and appropriate discount rate, 
may be extremely difficult to ascertain and vehemently disputed by the parties. 
Due to the sensitivity of the DCF methodology to such inputs, accepting one 
party’s assumptions over another may lead to wild swings in valuations. 
Nonetheless, the burden of proof does not direct the court to favor one party 
over another—the court must conduct its own independent analysis.152 Thus, 
 
147 See, e.g., In re Orchard Enter., No. 5713-CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) 
(“A comparable, or market-based, approach to valuation is rooted in the same intuition as the DCF 
method. But rather than directly estimating the future cash flows of the subject company and 
reducing them to present value, the market-based methods draw inferences about the future 
expected cash flows from the market’s expectations about comparable companies . . . . [But] 
[r]eliance on a comparable companies or comparable transactions approach is improper where the 
purported ‘comparables’ involve significantly different products or services than the company whose 
appraisal is at issue, or vastly different multiples.” (footnotes omitted)). 
148 See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (“The utility of 
the comparable company approach depends on the similarity between the company the court is 
valuing and the companies used for comparison. At some point, the differences become so large that 
the use of the comparable company method becomes meaningless for valuation purposes.”). 
149 See Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 56 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting 
that an expert’s “comparable company methodology suffer[ed] from the same problem the court 
found with his comparable transactions analysis—namely, the companies [he] examined were not 
sufficiently comparable to [the target company] to render his work reliable for purposes of a 
Delaware appraisal proceeding”). 
150 See Richter et al., supra note 4, at 19 (“The methodology most often used by the court to 
determine going concern value is a discounted cash flow analysis, which is based in large part on 
assumptions and projections that themselves can be highly uncertain, including the company’s 
internally generated projections and speculative data about how the company would have performed 
if the merger had not occurred.”). 
151 That is, when companies are not widely traded. See Hamermesh & Wachter, Cornfields, supra note 
146, at 125-26 (noting that finance theory, i.e., DCF analysis, “is in fact weakest in those areas where 
appraisal is available”). 
152 The court in In re Appraisal of Ancestory.com, Inc. articulated this point, stating, “[Appraisal] 
is made particularly difficult for the bench judge, not simply because his training may not provide a 
background well-suited to the process, but also because of the way the statute is constructed . . . . A 
judge in a bench trial relies . . . on the burden of proof; he holds on to it like a shipwreck victim grasps 
a floating deckchair or an ex-smoker hoards his last piece of nicotine gum. Section 262 is unusual in 
that it purports explicitly to allocate the burden of proof to the petitioner and the respondent, an allocation 
not meaningful in light of the fact that no default exists if the burden is not met; in reality, the ‘burden’ 
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while DCF analysis is valuable in many cases, there may be certain instances where 
the court does not have particular expertise and cannot fall back on default 
presumptions to determine the appropriate inputs. Under such circumstances, 
the court cannot credibly conduct a DCF analysis, and as a result, has at times 
resorted to the merger price achieved in a robust sales process.153 
B. Calculating Synergies 
Delaware courts, however, cannot entirely defer to M&A markets because 
they must calculate the deal synergies that they are statutorily required to 
deduct when determining fair value.154 By formulating a structured approach 
to deducting synergies after adopting the proposed merger price framework, 
courts could create an even greater disincentive for bringing meritless appraisal 
claims, as petitioners would receive even less than the merger consideration they 
would have received had they not brought the claim. 
Synergy, according to one scholar, “is the additional value that is 
generated by combining two firms, creating opportunities that would not 
[have] been available to these firms operating independently.”155 Synergies are 
deal-specific,156 and must be calculated as such.157 Synergies can be divided 
broadly into two categories: operating synergies, which typically affect cash 
flow, and financial synergies, which can affect cash flow and discount rate.158 
Strategic buyers must be distinguished from financial investors, since 
strategic buyers are presumed to be able to benefit from synergies while 
financial investors are not.159 Thus, in an appraisal action where a financial 
 
falls on the judge to determine fair value, using ‘all relevant factors.’” No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); see also Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 20 (“A 
common lament from the members of the Court of Chancery is that the divergent valuations 
produced by the dueling experts often put them in an awkward situation in attempting to arrive at 
a sensible valuation in a situation where both parties formally share the ultimate burden of proof.”). 
153 See supra note 27. 
154 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016). 
155 Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Synergy 3 (Oct. 30, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=841486 [https://perma.cc/5R3T-YJAZ]. 
156 See Capturing Synergies in Dealmaking, CAP. AGENDA INSIGHTS (Ernst & Young, N.Y.), 
Oct. 2013, at 1, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_Capturing_synergies_in_dealmaking
/$FILE/EY-Capturing-synergies-in-dealmaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4YD-ZYPZ] (discussing how 
“[a]cquirers can use company-specific synergies as a competitive advantage”). 
157 See LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443, at 
*25 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (rejecting the application of average market premium to determine 
synergies because “general data . . . does not tell me anything about this specific transaction, which 
must be the focus in a Section 262 action”). 
158 Erik P. Gilje, Assistant Professor of Fin., The Wharton Sch., Synergy Valuation (Oct. 30, 2015). 
159 See Jan Vild & Claudia Zeisberger, Strategic Buyers v. Private Equity Buyers in an Investment 
Process 2 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2014/39/DSC/EFE, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439589 
[https://perma.cc/SDG2-594A] (noting that “strategic buyers were considered to have a significant 
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sponsor has acquired the target company, the fair value may simply be the 
merger price. Conversely, when the acquirer is a strategic buyer, there will be 
synergies that the court must back out when appraising the fair value of shares 
by using merger price as a starting point. 
The academic literature provides a rigorous analytical framework for 
valuing different kinds of synergies.160 Nevertheless, in the appraisal context, 
determining a synergy deduction from the merger price to arrive at fair value 
presents two notable problems: first, valuing synergies is highly dependent 
on inputs and assumptions, and it often requires the use of DCF analysis;161 
second, after the synergies are valued, it must be determined how much of 
them were embedded in the merger price.162 
These problems, however, are not insurmountable. Admittedly, it is 
somewhat awkward for proponents of merger-price-as-fair-value that the 
financial community quantifies most synergies using a DCF analysis.163 
However, it is not entirely inconsistent with the merger price approach. 
Being forced to use a DCF method for calculating synergies simply presents 
courts with a choice. On one hand, the court can just use a DCF method to 
value the entire target company, but the downside of this approach is that the 
court may believe that the DCF inputs in this scenario are inherently 
unreliable. On the other hand, the court can use the merger price as a starting 
point when it is skeptical of the inputs needed for a DCF, and then subtract 
from it the synergies calculated using the DCF analysis. While this approach 
also introduces a potentially flawed DCF analysis into the appraisal process, 
it narrows the possible valuation range somewhat because the merger price 
acts as an anchor and competing DCFs of synergies will likely yield a smaller 
range than competing DCFs of an entire target company. 
The second problem is the allocation of the value of the synergies between 
the buyer and the seller. Acquirers would not rationally buy other companies 
if the entire amount of the expected synergies were included in the merger 
price.164 The use of discovery is the solution to the problem of determining 
the relative allocation of value. Delaware law permits discovery of pre-suit 
 
advantage over financial investors . . . due to their ability to share with the sellers a portion of the 
value generated by the post-acquisition synergies”). 
160 See generally Damodaran, supra note 155 (reviewing numerous valuation approaches and 
variables). 
161 See id. at 10 (valuing operating synergies within a DCF framework). 
162 See id. at 10-11 (noting “synergy in a merger may well be worth $2 billion, but paying $3 
billion as a premium to get the acquisition done will destroy $1 billion of the acquiring company’s 
stockholder wealth”). 
163 See id. at 10 (discussing how to value operating synergy using a DCF analysis). 
164 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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valuation materials in appraisal proceedings.165 Thus, courts can look at an 
acquiring company’s valuation of the target, which certainly quantifies 
anticipated synergies. By comparing the acquirer’s valuation of the target 
company with synergies, the valuation without synergies, and the ultimate 
merger price, courts can triangulate the percentage of anticipated synergy 
value imbedded in the merger price. Multiplying the total synergy value—as 
determined by the court—with the percentage of synergies embedded in the 
deal price, courts can determine independently the appropriate synergy 
deduction from the deal price. Additionally, consideration of the acquiring 
company’s predicted synergies provides a check for the court in its own 
calculation of synergy value. 
Calculation of deal-specific synergies is feasible and should not pose a 
barrier to courts’ use of merger price as the best evidence of fair value in 
accordance with section 262. Delaware courts, however, have yet to put forth 
an analytical framework that both describes a deal-specific approach to 
valuing synergies and allocates the synergies between the buyer and the seller. 
Academics provide a rigorous approach to the former, and discovery is the 
best solution to the problem presented by the latter. By creating such a 
framework, the use of merger price as the best evidence of fair value is more 
credibly aligned with the statutory mandate of section 262. 
IV. APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE, MERGER PRICE,  
AND DELAWARE PRECEDENT 
The practice of appraisal arbitrage and the use of merger price as fair value 
dovetail in the case of LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corp.166 
The opinion emphasizes the impact of questionable DCF assumptions and a 
strong sale process in the appraisal context, with the court ultimately 
concluding that merger price represented the best evidence of fair value 
under such circumstances.167 The facts and analysis in the decision illustrate the 
difficulty courts face in independently valuing companies in certain 
circumstances. The decision also contains undertones of disapproval concerning 
the practice of appraisal arbitrage, which suggests that policy motivations may 
have also been at play in the court’s decision to rely on the merger price. 
Further, while the court did subtract out synergies from the merger price, as 
it is statutorily obligated to do, the court’s somewhat cursory treatment of the 
issue highlights the need for Delaware to strengthen its law governing the 
 
165 See In re Appraisal of Dole Foods Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 549 (Del. Ch. 2014) (rejecting 
objections to production of pre-suit valuation-related materials). 
166 No. 8094-VCP, 2015 WL 4540443 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015). 
167 See id. at *24 (concluding that “the Merger price [was] a reliable indication” of the 
company’s fair value). 
2016] Relying on Merger Price 179 
analysis of synergies. This is especially important if Delaware courts wish to 
credibly continue placing full weight on merger price in appraisal proceedings. 
Finally, the Chancery Court’s recent decisions in In re Appraisal of Dell Inc.168 and 
In re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp.169 highlight instances in which this Comment’s 
proposed framework is inapplicable. 
A. Background of LongPath 
Ramtron International Corporation (Ramtron) was “a fabless semiconductor 
company that design[ed], develop[ed] and market[ed] specialized semiconductor 
memory and integrated semiconductor solutions.”170 Ramtron produced a type 
of memory called ferroelectric RAM (F-RAM) and outsourced the 
manufacturing of “the silicon wafers used in its products . . . to a separate 
company known as a ‘fab’ or a ‘foundry.’”171 F-RAM presents benefits over 
other types of memory because it is fast and durable, uses little power, and 
“retain[s] memory when power is lost.”172 
Perhaps somewhat obviously, Ramtron’s relationship with its foundry was 
“vitally important” to its existence since it could not produce F-RAM without 
these outsourced silicon wafers.173 In 2009, Fujitsu, Ramtron’s foundry at the 
time, “gave Ramtron a ‘last-time buy’ notice,” signifying that it intended to 
end its relationship in two years.174 Transitioning to a new foundry is a 
complicated process that can take years, as the court described: 
[T]ransitioning to a new foundry requires understanding the foundry’s 
manufacturing technology and how it interacts with the semiconductors as 
designed, then modifying the product design to eliminate any resulting 
errors, then completing several rounds of product testing followed by further 
design modifications to eliminate any previously undiscovered errors, and 
then allowing the customers to evaluate the product before finally moving to 
full-scale production.175 
When Ramtron received this last-time buy notice, it had already been 
attempting over the past five years to establish a second foundry relationship 
with Texas Instruments (TI), yet this relationship was not fully formed until 
 
168 No. 9322–VCL, 2016 WL 3186538 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016). 
169 No. 10107–CB, 2016 WL 3753123 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016). 
170 Ramtron Int’l Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 7, 2012). The term “fabless” refers 
to “an electronics business: that has no manufacturing plant; that contracts out the manufacture of 
components (esp. microchips) to another company.” Fabless, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2016). 
171 LongPath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *1. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at *2. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
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2011.176 Because of its difficult transition from Fujitsu to TI, Ramtron 
experienced product shortages and had to put its customers on allocation.177 
Customers placed on allocation would only be supplied a reduced percentage 
of their total order.178 To avoid this situation from occurring again, Ramtron 
tried to develop a new secondary foundry relationship with IBM.179 This 
attempt, which spanned from 2009 to 2012, was a failure and cost Ramtron 
$33 million, a large sunk cost for a company that had about $66 million in 
revenue in 2011.180 However, in July 2012, “Ramtron entered into a 
manufacturing agreement with ROHM Co., Ltd. (‘ROHM’)” for ROHM to 
serve as Ramtron’s second foundry.181 
The combination of putting its customers on allocation and the way 
Ramtron’s point-of-purchase revenue recognition system worked resulted in 
masked actual demand for Ramtron’s products and an inventory buildup.182 
Ramtron recognized revenue on a point-of-purchase basis, rather than a 
point-of-sale basis, meaning that it recognized revenue when its products 
were shipped to a distributor rather than when its products were purchased 
by end users.183 This choice in revenue recognition systems made it more 
difficult for Ramtron to forecast future sales.184 Furthermore, because they 
were placed on allocation, Ramtron’s customers began over-ordering to “game 
the allocation system” in an effort to ensure they received a sufficient supply 
of F-RAM, and Ramtron, in turn, began ordering more wafers from TI to 
meet this inflated demand.185 The result of this order manipulation was an 
inventory bubble for Ramtron, an over-recognition of revenue,186 and a cash 
crunch due to increased inventory costs.187 The outcome of these practices 
was distorted (and unrealistically high) demand and revenue figures. 
 
176 See id. at *3 (describing this shaky transition). 
177 Id. 
178 See id. at *4 (describing how a customer might be “allocated 80% of its ordered amount”). 
179 Id. at *3. 
180 See id. (detailing Ramtron’s failed IBM investment and its associated costs). 
181 Id. 
182 See id. at *4 (noting the “chain of events” that led to a “massive inventory bubble, over 
recognition of revenue, and resulting cash crunch” for Ramtron). 
183 Id. at *3. 
184 See id. at *4 (explaining that the point-of-purchase method increases the difficulty of forecasting 
future actual demand because of the “buffer” distributors provide). 
185 Id. 
186 There was over-recognition because Ramtron forced excess inventory into distribution 
channels, a practice known as “channel stuffing,” and its point-of-purchase recognition system 
allowed Ramtrom to recognize revenue at that point in time. Id. 
187 Id. Ramtron repeatedly missed or was forced to renegotiate its loan covenants due to 
shortfalls in cash because of these increased inventory costs. Id. at *5. 
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While Ramtron was facing these difficulties, Cypress Semiconductor 
Corporation (Cypress) began pursuing the company.188 “On March 8, 2011, 
Cypress made a nonpublic written offer . . . of $3.01 per share,” representing a 
thirty-seven percent premium over the closing price of Ramtron’s stock.189 
Ramtron later rejected the offer as inadequate, but still desperately needed capital 
to fund its excess inventory.190 Because there was a dearth of willing lenders, 
Ramtron launched a secondary public offering in July 2011 of 4,750,000 shares, 
representing approximately twenty percent of outstanding shares, at $2 per 
share.191 Indicative of Ramtron’s struggles was the fact that the price of its 
secondary offering was lower than the market price of its stock in July 2011, 
which fluctuated between $3.12 per share and $2.19 per share.192 Even after 
this equity infusion, Ramtron continued to face severe cash shortages.193 
Despite being initially rebuffed, Cypress continued to try to acquire 
Ramtron. On June 12, 2012, Cypress publicly declared that it wanted to 
acquire Ramtron for $2.48 per share, which represented the same thirty-seven 
percent premium as its previous, nonpublic offer.194 In response, Ramtron 
rejected the offer as inadequate, announced that it was exploring strategic 
alternatives, and decided to generate long-term management projections.195 
Importantly, Ramtron’s management had been newly installed and had never 
before created multiyear projections, but rather had prepared five-quarter 
forecasts.196 On June 14, two days after the announcement of Cypress’s offer, 
Balzer, Ramtron’s CEO, told his executive team by email that he wanted a 
“product by product build up, with assumptions, for it to hold water in the 
event of a subsequent dispute.”197 Richards, Ramtron’s CFO, later testified 
that he understood that the long-term projections were to be used to market 
the company to a white knight and as inputs for a DCF analysis.198 
Meanwhile, “Cypress commenced a hostile tender offer for Ramtron at 
$2.68 per share” on June 21.199 Ramtron’s board rejected this offer and 
 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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192 See Ramtron International, GOOGLE FIN., https://www.google.com/finance/historical?cid=
656974&startdate=Jul+1%2C+2011&enddate=Jul+31%2C+2011&ei=ngXnVrmoJM2aecz8iqgM [https:
//perma.cc/6CDY-XEPB] (reporting a monthly high closing price of $3.12 per share on July 19, 2011, 
and a monthly low closing price of $2.19 per share on July 28, 2011). 
193 LongPath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *5. 
194 Id. at *6. 
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199 Id. at *7. 
182 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 153 
“recommended that the shareholders not tender their shares.”200 Yet, soon 
thereafter, Ramtron issued second quarter earnings substantially below 
expectations.201 Ramtron had offered public guidance for 2012 revenue of $70 
million, yet, at its current pace, it was on track to miss this target by at least $10 
million.202 “Merriman Capital, the only analyst covering Ramtron, downgraded 
the” company’s rating to “neutral” and predicted that its stock price could fall 
below $2 per share.203 Although there are many potential explanations for 
Ramtron’s decline in performance, the court found that “operational shortcomings 
of Ramtron were the primary cause of the decline in sales.”204 
Despite Ramtron’s poor performance, Cypress increased its tender offer to 
$2.88 per share.205 Ramtron’s board again rejected this bid as inadequate, 
despite its inability to find another buyer.206 Seemingly without any other 
option, representatives of Ramtron began meeting with representatives of 
Cypress on September 12, 2012.207 These active negotiations resulted in a final 
transaction price of $3.10 per share, and on September 18, the parties entered 
into a merger agreement.208 The merger was approved by a shareholder vote on 
November 20, 2012.209 
Approximately one month after the announcement of the merger, LongPath 
Capital, LLC (LongPath) began acquiring Ramtron shares.210 Ultimately, 
LongPath acquired 484,700 shares211 and timely filed an appraisal action on 
December 11, 2012.212 While LongPath could not have known then which 
method the Chancery Court would use to value its shares, there were some 
indications prior to LongPath even filing its suit that the merger price—and 
not a DCF analysis—may be the best indication of fair value. 
To start, Longpath should have known that the Ramtron sale process was 
robust and that Ramtron’s financial projections were untrustworthy. At the 
very least, Longpath had access to Ramtron’s Preliminary Proxy Statement, 
which was filed with the SEC on October 19, 2012—the same time that 
Longpath began buying up Ramtrom shares.213 Ramtron’s Preliminary Proxy 
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makes clear that the Ramtron board retained competent financial and legal 
counsel and attempted to run a robust sales process before ultimately 
concluding that a sale to Cypress was in the best interest of its shareholders.214 
This process included Ramtron reaching out to and negotiating with various 
third parties and repeatedly rejecting offers from Cypress over the course of 
several months before the parties finally agreed upon a merger price.215 
Moreover, the Preliminary Proxy Statement could have also indicated to a 
keen observer that Ramtron’s projections were likely to be suspect in the eyes 
of Delaware law. Most importantly, Cypress’s bid prompted management to 
initiate a “process in generating an updated financial model in connection with 
Ramtron’s strategic plan.”216 Further, given its sizable investment in Ramtron, 
LongPath almost certainly would have read the reports of Merriman Capital, 
the only analyst covering the company. After Ramtron released disappointing 
second quarter 2012 earnings, Merriman Capital suspended its target price for 
Ramtron’s stock and stated that it “simply c[ould]n’t figure out how to model 
this company consistently at the current time.”217 Thus, while LongPath may 
have genuinely believed that the merger price undervalued Ramtron, a DCF 
analysis did not seem like a strong way to make this argument. 
B. Holding and Reasoning of Longpath 
Ultimately, the court decided that the merger price, less synergies, was 
the fair value of LongPath’s shares.218 The court came to this conclusion 
because the “inputs [were] unreliable” for a DCF analysis and “the sales 
process . . . was thorough.”219 Specifically, the court noted four reasons why 
the assumptions underlying the DCF analysis in this case were fatally flawed. 
First, the court found management’s projections to be unreliable because they 
were prepared after Cypress made an offer, giving Ramtron management an 
incentive to skew the projections upwards.220 The court concluded that “the 
 
214 After receiving Cypress’s renewed bid on June 12, 2012, Ramtron’s board authorized the 
retention of Shearman & Sterling as legal counsel and Needham & Company as financial advisor. Id. at 
20. Additionally, Ramtron formed a “Strategic Transaction Committee” to “assist [the] board of directors 
in considering any acquisition proposals from Cypress and any transactions that may be considered as 
alternatives to Cypress’s indication of interest.” Id. at 17. Finally, Ramtron’s board determined the merger 
was “advisable, fair to and in the best interests of Ramtron and its stockholders.” Id. at 3. 
215 Id. at 21-31. 
216 Id. at 20. 
217 LongPath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *13. 
218 Id. at *1. 
219 Id. 
220 See id. at *11 (noting that the “projections were prepared in anticipation of potential 
litigation, or, at least, a hostile takeover bid” and that “one of the purposes of the projections was to 
serve as a marketing tool” in search of a white knight, which gave “the management team an incentive 
to err on the optimistic side”). 
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projections were not prepared in the ordinary course of business,” and as such, 
they “facially lack[ed] the indicia of reliability that generally have led 
Delaware courts to defer to management projections.”221 The “final nail on 
the coffin for the Management Projections [was] that Ramtron did not rely 
on them in the ordinary course of its business,” as it used a different set of 
projections to manage Ramtron’s finances.222 
Second, the management projections were unreliable because they lacked 
forecasting ability; they were prepared by a new management team that did 
not have a deep understanding of the business or experience making long-term 
projections.223 Ramtron’s own management recognized its limitations with 
forecasting,224 and, in evaluating Ramtron’s recent forecasting record, the court 
concluded “that management, even under its traditional forecasting system, was 
of middling quality when it came to forecasting Ramtron’s future business.”225 
Third, the projections did not fit with the realities of the F-RAM 
business. The management projections assumed that Ramtron would be able 
to transition to ROHM wafers in sixty days, even though it took seven years 
for Ramtrom to transition from Fujitsu to TI.226 Additionally, transitioning to 
a new foundry required a substantial cash investment, yet Ramtron was cash-poor 
at the time of the merger.227 Finally, the projections defied historical trends, 
indicating a period of “previously unknown prosperity” immediately following a 
time of enormous difficulty—a “dramatic turnaround . . . despite no underlying 
changes that would justify such an improvement of business.”228 
Finally, the projections relied on 2011 and 2012 revenue figures that were 
distorted by customer allocation issues and channel stuffing—in essence, 
revenue manipulation.229 The court pointed out that these issues resulted in 
fundamentally flawed projections: “[i]f 2011 and 2012 are used as base years in 
forecasting, but those years include inflated revenue because of either over-
ordering by customers placed on allocation or channel stuffing, then the reliability 
of the projections is affected.”230 The court declined to correct for this issue.231 
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Given the numerous flaws in management projections, the court instead 
looked to merger price as a possible indication of fair value. The court 
recognized that while the merger price does not necessarily always equal fair 
value,232 in the appropriate situation, where there has been a robust sale 
process, Delaware courts have viewed merger price as evidence of fair value: 
[I]n the situation of a proper transactional process likely to have resulted in an 
accurate valuation of an acquired corporation, this Court has looked to the merger 
price as evidence of fair value and, on occasion, given that metric one-hundred 
percent weight. In an oft-quoted passage, then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs wrote: 
“The fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective market 
reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of a 
valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair.” Similarly, 
Chief Justice Strine, then writing as a Vice Chancellor, noted: “[O]ur case law 
recognizes that when there is an open opportunity to buy a company, the 
resulting market price is reliable evidence of fair value.”233 
The mere fact that only one company had made a bid for Ramtron did not 
affect the court’s determination that a robust sales process had occurred.234 In 
the court’s view, Ramtron had conducted a thorough sale process by repeatedly 
rejecting Cypress’s offers and doing everything in its power to solicit other 
buyers.235 All of these factors led the court to accept the merger price as the 
best evidence of fair price.236 
Taken together, the fact that the projections were irreparably tainted and 
that there was a robust sale process would have alone been enough for the 
court to use the merger price as the exclusive best evidence of fair value. The 
court, however, took the additional step of expressing its displeasure with the 
practice of appraisal arbitrage and, more generally, the use of litigation to 
determine a company’s value. This additional discussion suggests that in 
using merger price as the best evidence of fair value, the court may have 
been motivated not by LongPath’s substantive arguments, but by policy 
 
232 See id. at *20 (offering a short-form merger as one such situation). 
233 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
234 See id. at *21 (noting that the court was “not aware of any case holding that a multi-bidder auction 
of a company is a prerequisite to finding that the merger price is a reliable indicator of fair value”). 
235 See id. (“Ramtron could, and repeatedly did, reject Cypress’ overtures. Simultaneously, 
Ramtron actively solicited every buyer it believed could be interested in a transaction. The Company 
provided several of those potential buyers with the much-vaunted Management Projections. No one 
bid. LongPath contends that the lack of other bidders indicates a flawed process. I disagree. Any 
impediments to a higher bid resulted from Ramtron’s operative reality, not shortcomings of the 
Merger process.”). 
236 See id. at *20 (concluding that “the Merger price offers the best indication of fair value”). 
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considerations.237 Indeed, the court criticized LongPath’s investment strategy 
and implied that LongPath’s arguments were absurd: 
LongPath asks this Court to adopt its $4.96 figure and conclude that the 
market left an amount on the table exceeding Ramtron’s unaffected market 
capitalization. This would be a significant market failure, especially in the 
context of a well-publicized hostile bid and a target actively seeking a white 
knight. But, LongPath itself is a market participant. It bought its shares after 
the announcement of the Merger, thereby effectively purchasing an appraisal 
lawsuit. Although such arbitrage can be profitable on the merits when flawed 
deals undervalue companies, LongPath invested an amount so small that, 
even if I accepted its position and concluded that Ramtron’s true value at the 
time of the Merger was somewhere in the range of $4.96 per share, this 
lawsuit is likely a less-than-break-even proposition for LongPath after 
considering its litigation expenses.238 
Based on its investment strategy, it is unlikely that LongPath actually 
wanted to litigate this case, but rather bought into the lawsuit to use the threat 
of appraisal to extract higher consideration.239 
Further, the court has expressed a dim view of buying into lawsuits just 
to extract a profit: “Much has been said of litigation-driven valuations, none 
of it favorable.”240 As the court pointed out, valuations generated for trials 
strain credibility.241 In so noting, the court implied that valuations generated 
by a robust sales process should be preferred over the expert valuations that 
are presented in court. Extending the court’s commentary to its logical 
conclusion, the court seems to indicate that it is willing and able to clamp 
down on appraisal suits when inappropriately brought. 
 
237 See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Litigation, supra note 5, at 24 (“[O]ne potential 
explanation—though perhaps too cynical—is that the recent spate of defeats the Delaware Court of 
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Because of the statutory requirements of section 262(h), the court was not 
finished in determining fair value; rather, it still had to back out any synergies 
that arose because of the merger. The court followed its mandate; however, it 
only provided a cursory explanation for its acceptance of one party’s synergy 
figure over the other’s.242 Moving forward, for the Delaware courts to be able 
to credibly use merger price as the best evidence of fair value consistent with 
section 262, the courts must better articulate an analytical framework for 
assessing synergies. As shown in Section III.B., this is a feasible task. 
C. Dell and DFC Global 
The Chancery Court had been on a streak of allotting one-hundred percent 
weight to merger price as evidence of fair value in appraisal cases.243 In the 
summer of 2016, however, the court deviated from this trend. In In re Appraisal 
of Dell Inc., the Chancery Court refused to give any credence to the merger 
price and entirely relied on DCF analysis,244 while in In re Appraisal of DFC 
Global Corp. the Court opted for an equal balancing of DCF analysis, comparable 
companies analysis, and transaction price to arrive at its determination of fair 
value.245 These decisions, nevertheless, do not spell the death of the exclusive use 
of merger prices as the best indication of fair value in certain cases. Dell and DFC 
Global are readily distinguishable from decisions like LongPath, and do not 
undercut the framework advanced by this Comment: that the Court of Chancery 
should defer to merger price when there is a true market test and the inputs for 
DCF analysis are unreliable. 
Neither Dell nor DFC Global had both conditions that this Comment 
suggests must be present for an acquiring company to be shielded with use of the 
merger price as the best evidence of fair value. In particular, neither case would 
be afforded protection because there was not a true market test in either case. 
In Dell, the court determined that the fair value of Dell’s shares was $17.62,246 
approximately twenty-six percent higher than the merger consideration of $13.65 
per share.247 The court eschewed the merger price and relied exclusively on DCF 
analysis to arrive at its determination of fair value.248 While acknowledging and 
citing recent decisions that relied exclusively on merger price, the court 
distinguished the case at hand, in part, by noting that all of the decisions 
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deferring to merger price “either involved a more active pre-signing market 
check or the process was kicked off by an unsolicited third-party bid.”249 
When seeking to sell the company, Dell only reached out to three 
potential bidders, all financial sponsors.250 Financial sponsors are generally 
believed to be able to pay less for companies because they do not benefit from 
the same sort of synergies as strategic buyers,251 and they are constrained by 
return thresholds for their investors.252 Two of the three financial sponsors 
quickly dropped out, eliminating price competition and leaving Dell 
negotiating with one other party.253 The court found that this set of facts 
resulted in “a lack of meaningful price competition during the pre-signing 
phase.”254 The court was also dismissive of the effectiveness of the go-shop 
during the post-signing phase.255 Thus, because there was not a robust market 
test in Dell, the company would not have been afforded the merger price 
protection proposed in this Comment. 
In DFC Global, the court held that the fair value of the company’s shares 
was $10.21, $0.71 above the merger price.256 The court reached this conclusion 
through an equal “blend of three imperfect techniques: a discounted cash flow 
model incorporating certain methodologies and assumptions each expert made 
and some of [the court’s] own, the comparable company analysis respondent’s 
expert performed, and the transaction price.”257 While the court acknowledged 
that there was “an arm’s-length process and a robust bidding environment,”258 
it refused to afford one-hundred percent weight to the merger price because 
the transaction “was negotiated and consummated during a period of significant 
company turmoil and regulatory uncertainty, calling into question the reliability 
of the transaction price as well as management’s financial projections.”259 Thus, 
because market conditions undermined the reliability of the sales process and 
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resulting merger price,260 DFC Global would not have been afforded merger 
price protection under this Comment’s proposed framework. 
V. A (LONG)PATH FORWARD 
Although they have not articulated a formal test for when to use merger 
price as the best indication of fair value in the appraisal context, Delaware 
courts have tended to take a two-pronged approach in the third-party merger 
context: first, there must be reason to doubt the reliability of the inputs needed 
to conduct a DCF; and second, there must have been a robust sale process of 
the target company.261 This approach first provides a rationale for bucking the 
DCF default, and then identifies a reasonable alternative to valuation. I 
contend that when these two conditions hold, the Chancery Court should 
automatically defer to merger price as the best indication of fair value. 
Some scholars fundamentally disagree with the use of the merger price, 
even less synergies, as the best evidence of fair value. They argue that third-
party sale value is equivalent to the opportunity cost of the asset, which is 
analytically distinct from the concept of going concern value.262 They point out 
that, in fact, “opportunity cost as a theoretical concept actually results in a lower 
value” than going concern value, because “[i]n equilibrium, all value-enhancing 
transactions have already taken place, so that the value to the next best user is 
 
260 See id. at *21-22 (“By the same token, the market price is informative of fair value only 
when it is the product of not only a fair sale process, but also of a well-functioning market. . . . Th[e] 
same uncertainty inherent in the projections underlying the discounted cash flow analysis [due to 
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synergies provides the most reliable method of determining the fair value of the petitioner’s shares.” 
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262 See, e.g., Hamermesh & Wachter, Implicit Minority Discount, supra note 144, at 31 (“The 
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cost of the asset in its next-best use. The term opportunity cost is used because, if the inputs were 
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in an alternative use represents its opportunity cost. The opportunity cost concept is not a measure 
of going concern value, but a measure of next-best-use value.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Lawrence 
A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 1021, 1040 (2009) (“The flaw of the third-party sale value argument is that it assumes 
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actually lower than current use value.”263 While the logical coherence of this 
argument is indisputable, it overlooks the fact that these scholars’ favored 
approach to valuation, the DCF methodology, may be nearly impossible in 
certain situations.264 The extended discussion of the LongPath decision above is 
intended to illustrate just how difficult it can be for courts to conduct their own 
independent valuations in certain circumstances. Thus, in such instances, 
courts must choose between conducting an inherently flawed DCF analysis and 
deferring to a market outcome. When choosing between these imperfect 
alternatives, courts should elect to embrace the third-party sale option. 
Additionally, the rationale behind deferring to the merger price in 
instances where there was a true market test for the company is consistent 
with longstanding tenets of Delaware law.265 In general, when decisions are 
informed, voluntary, and unconflicted, Delaware courts favor deferring to 
corporate decisionmakers, rather than imposing their own judgment.266 In the 
appraisal setting, Delaware courts have invoked a principle analogous to the 
business judgment rule when accepting the merger price as the best evidence 
of fair value.267 The existence of a robust sales process gives courts confidence 
that the eventually agreed upon transaction price was fair, since potential 
buyers with actual dollars at stake vetted the target company with the goal of 
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267 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (noting “the difficulties, if not outright incongruities, of a law-trained judge 
determining fair value of a company in light of an auction sale, aided by experts offering wildly 
different opinions on value”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 
340, 359 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“For me (as a law-trained judge) to second-guess the price that resulted 
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in hubris and, at best, reasoned guess-work.”); Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., No. 7046, 1991 WL 
29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991) (“The fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of 
objective market reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of a 
valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair.”). 
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putting forth a competitive offer.268 Potential acquirers, of course, are 
expected to conduct their own DCFs as part of their individual valuations. 
However, these DCFs are not performed with an eye toward litigation, but 
rather as a starting point in a negotiating process with the target company.269 
Sophisticated investors are also arguably better at performing DCF analyses 
than law-trained judges. The final merger price, in a competitive auction 
process, is the outcome of real-world bargaining that represents what a buyer 
is actually willing to pay for a company, while a judge-conducted DCF 
performed by the courts is simply the court’s best estimate of what a company 
was hypothetically worth.270 
Increased use of merger price as the best evidence of fair value could have 
a dramatic effect on appraisal arbitrageurs’ investment strategy. Courts may 
embrace merger price because of the rationales detailed above or out of a 
desire to fight the practice of appraisal arbitrage itself,271 but no matter the 
courts’ motivation, the outcome for appraisal arbitrageurs is the same—they 
cannot profit from this investment strategy. This movement away from DCF 
analysis, therefore, could be the death knell for appraisal as a speculative 
investment strategy, at least in the third-party merger context when the 
underlying assumptions for a DCF analysis are suspect and there was a robust 
sales process. When these two conditions hold, any appraisal claims are at 
best inefficient, and, at worst, frivolous. For an appraisal arbitrageur to buy 
into a lawsuit in such a situation would be pure financial speculation because 
he does not have any reliable financial data to support an argument that the 
fair value is higher than the merger price. Financial markets, not courtrooms, 
are the appropriate forums for such speculation. The likely outcome of this 
shift to a merger price safe harbor would be reductions in frivolous appraisal 
claims and in the threat of appraisal to beneficial deals, as well as increased 
disclosure to demonstrate that the sales process was thorough. 
 
268 See, e.g., Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359 (“The benefit of the active market for [the target 
company] as an entity that the sales process generated is that several buyers with a profit motive 
were able to assess these factors for themselves and to use those assessments to make bids with actual 
money behind them.”). 
269 See In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 549 (Del. Ch. 2014) (granting 
motion to compel production of valuation-related materials in an appraisal case because “pre-
litigation valuations are relevant to the central issue in the proceeding” and “also are relevant to 
issues of [sic] such as the appropriate inputs and considerations for valuation methodologies”). 
270 See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359 (“For me (as a law-trained judge) to second-guess the price that 
resulted from that [robust sales] process involves an exercise in hubris and, at best, reasoned guess-work.”). 
271 See supra note 237. 
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CONCLUSION 
Not only is it statutorily permissible to use merger price as the best 
evidence of fair value, under certain circumstances, it is preferable. If there is 
a thorough sales process and the inputs required for a DCF analysis are 
unreliable, then the merger price is almost certainly a better indication of fair 
value than a court’s own independent DCF analysis. This approach not only 
incentivizes greater disclosure regarding the sale process of the target 
company, but also it deters appraisal arbitrage when it is likely frivolous. 
When a DCF analysis is unreliable and there was a fulsome sale process, 
appraisal arbitrageurs are likely doing no more than engaging in financial 
speculation. Rather than protecting long-term shareholder interests, appraisal 
arbitrageurs may simply be looking for a settlement above the merger price. 
The Chancery Court has the institutional capacity to deter these unwanted, 
speculative, and potentially abusive appraisal claims; indeed, through the use 
of a merger price framework, this Comment argues that the court is better 
suited to solve this problem than the legislature is, even considering the 
recently enacted amendments. 
By adopting the proposed merger price framework and formulating a 
method for deducting synergies, courts can lessen the uncertainty of the 
appraisal process, deter meritless appraisal claims, and, hopefully, increase the 
frequency of deals that are beneficial to long-term shareholder interests. 
